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New Interview: Project on Government Oversight
With I am sure must be an under-the-table nod to Walt Kelley’s seminal comic Pogo (Kelley coined the phrase “We have met the enemy and he is us”), the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is a nonpartisan independent watchdog that has been championing good government reforms since 1981. POGO says its “investigations into corruption, misconduct, and conflicts of interest achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and ethical federal government.” Nothing wrong with that.Given that my book We Meant Well does little but chronicle a year’s worth of corruption, misconduct and conflicts of interest, plus stupidity, bad management and simple laziness in the reconstruction of Iraq, the nice folks at POGO were interested in learning more. We had a chance to chat, and they turned that into an interesting interview now posted on their website.
POGO: The Commission on Wartime Contracting found that the U.S. has wasted $31 to $60 billion in Iraq and Afghanistan on contracting. Do you think we’ve learned any lessons here?
Peter Van Buren: The mistakes certainly aren’t over—we continue to make the same ones in Afghanistan. Two presidents have now told us that our role in Iraq and Afghanistan was to create stability in the Middle East. If that is the definition of success, we’ve failed with enormous cost, and over an enormous period of time. I don’t think any lessons have been learned. We continue to repeat the same errors because we don’t know what else to do. For example, when the PRT program in Iraq was shut down—not because it was successful—those very same contractors who failed in Iraq, were picked up in Afghanistan.
Read the whole piece on POGO’s website.
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
Why There is Little Hope
Michael Thibault was co-chairman and commissioner of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC). The CWC released its final report in August and officially sunset a month later—with all of its internal records happily sealed from public view until 2031. Now, Thibault joins DynCorp International as its vice president of government finance and compliance.DynCorp, one of the three primary military and State Department LOGCAP IV contractors, is currently the 32nd largest contractor in the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) Federal Contractor Misconduct Database. It has nine instances of misconduct since the early 2000s and $19.6 million in penalties.
Another loyal public servant is Gordon Heddell, who resigned as the Pentagon’s Inspector General on Christmas Eve. Heddell has landed a job with federal contractor and global consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton. Booz Allen, the 29th largest contractor in POGO’s database, has two misconduct instances and $3.7 million in penalties. Booz Allen derives a substantial amount of business from contracts with the Defense Department.
Thanks for your service gentlemen. Nothing to see here folks, so move along…
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
How Much has the US Spent in Iraq and Afghanistan? It’s a Secret!
“Open government” and “transparency” must always get them giggling in Washington, just whacked out funny words that make the hippies vote and all those sincere, well-meaning folks who donate cash to the Democrats. Yeah, sure, transparency, but not on my watch.For example, the Commission on Wartime Contracting. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan last submitted another sad report to Congress in August, saying the federal government wasted between $30-60 billion (nothing like a 100% range to make you feel comfy) on contracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that without “major changes in law and policy” we’ll enjoy such a large degree of waste in future conflicts already now in planning. The waste works out to one in every six dollars spent. Of course, I wrote an entire book about all this waste, albeit on the smaller scale where I worked, while the Commission on Wartime Contracting picked up on two juicy examples of waste– a $40 million prison in Iraq the country did not want and which was not completed, and a $300 million Kabul power plant that requires sustained funding and expertise that Kabul does not have the resources to provide.
Want to know more? Hah hah transparent government heads, you can’t. Not until at least 2031, as the records from the congressionally mandated panel will remain sealed to the public until 2031, for some sort of blah blah blah security blah blah reason. But don’t worry– we’ll still be at war in Afghanistan in 2031.
Now some people in Congress arose from the dead to say this is a bad idea.
Senators Claire McCaskill and Jim Webb, who both originally pushed for the creation of the Commission to probe the more than $200 billion the U.S. government spent on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade are politely demanding that the commission’s internal records be opened to the public.
“We learned of this development (to seal the records) after the fact,” they wrote. “The commission did not seek the advice or involvement of appropriate congressional committees or staff in formulating this recommendation.” Sealing the commission’s records until 2031, they added, was a “lengthy and excessive delay. Simply stated, we need to live in the light,” the Senators wrote. “Sealing records for 20 years in inconsistent with the goals we established for the commission when Congress acted to create the commission three years ago.”
Well, that should fix things. If not, keep an eye on this blog for a full report in 2031.
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
Want to Know the Cost of Iraq War? Wait until 2031
The internal records of a congressionally mandated panel that reported staggering estimates of wasteful U.S. wartime spending will remain sealed to the public until 2031, officials confirmed, as the panel closes its doors on Friday.The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was established by Congress in 2008 and spent three years probing more than $206 billion the U.S. government spent on contracts and grants during a decade of conflict.
In a final, 240-page report issued in late August, the panel estimated that the U.S. had wasted or misspent between $31 billion and $60 billion contracting for services. The commission’s management estimates that the three years of research and investigations themselves cost approximately $25 million.
Want to know more? Wait until 2031 (no hurry, we’ll still be at war in Afghanistan), or read the whole article.
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
We Pay for Both Sides of Iraq, Afghan Wars
What better way to ensure that our wars of terror will never end than to actually pay for both sides of the struggle. It worked well in Iraq, where our reconstruction and contracting money filtered down to the insurgents attacking us, and now, also, in Afghanistan. Think of it as a kind of terrorist “stimulus package.”In Iraq, in just one example, insurgent groups financed their war in part with hundreds of thousands of dollars in US rebuilding funds extorted from Iraqi contractors in Anbar. The payments, in return for the insurgents’ allowing supplies to move and construction work to begin, had taken place since the earliest projects in 2003.
After examining hundreds of combat support and reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan, the US military estimates $360 million in your tax dollars has ended up in the hands of people the American-led coalition has spent nearly a decade battling: the Taliban, criminals and power broker thugs with ties to both.
There’s good news: the Army maintains that “only a small percentage of the $360 million has been garnered by the Taliban and insurgent groups. The bulk of the money was lost to profiteering, bribery and extortion.” Whew, feelin’ better now.
One Afghan warlord, Rohullah, operated a protection racket, charging contractors moving US military supplies along the highway as much as $1,500 a vehicle. Failure to pay virtually guaranteed a convoy would be attacked. While Rohullah’s guards regularly fought with the Taliban, Rohullah also moved money to the Taliban when it was in his interest to do so. He received over $1.7 million in USG money, the task force discovered.
Contracting will be seen by historians as the achilles heal of the war effort. This, plus the losses to the bad guys detailed above, is no secret. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan laid out the story quite clearly, stating:
Poor planning and oversight by the US government, as well as poor performance on the part of contractors, have costly outcomes: time and money misspent are lost for other purposes. Criminal behavior and blatant corruption sap dollars from what could otherwise be successful project outcomes and, more disturbingly, contribute to a climate in which huge amounts of waste are accepted as the norm.
The US Embassy in Baghdad declined to provide anyone to discuss the allegations. An embassy spokesman said “in terms of contracting practices, we have checks and balances in our contract awarding system to prevent any irregularities from occurring.”
Not to worry in Afghanistan either. Army officials calmed those worried by noting “Overall, the $360 million represents a fraction of the $31 billion in active US contracts that the task force reviewed.”
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
State Fumbles $172.4 Million Intended For Afghan Police Training
Some things just don’t go well together: hot dogs and ketchup, cats and dogs, and the State Department and contracting. Just doesn’t work.
You’ll recall State Management Droid Pat Kennedy, back in early June, told the Commission on Wartime Contracting how the Department has increased its oversight of contractors. Among other things, State has hired 102 additional people in Washington to administer contracts.
And then we wrote how State refused to allow the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to audit their police training mission. The US has spent billions training Iraqi police since 2003, and little has been accomplished outside the hemorrhaging of US money into the hands of Dynacorp, the contractor designated by the USG to steal all that money. State says SIGIR jurisdiction is limited to “reconstruction” activities, as opposed to “technical assistance and capacity-building.” A fight before Congress will resolve the matter since the kids can’t settle it on their own.
Wonder why State was so shy about allowing inspections? Maybe this will clarify things.
A new joint audit found that State didn’t properly handle $172.4 million from funds for the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Additionally, the report found that some of those funds went to paying contractors for hours they didn’t work. Some of the money was improperly spent in other areas, even though it was specifically designated for training the ANP.
The report says that the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs used $22.47 million for “a United Nations contribution, the Federal Prosecutors Program, counternarcotics personnel salaries, travel costs, and a DynCorp equitable adjustment.” Some money went towards ANP salaries but not training as it was intended.
More than $300,000 went to travel costs from Texas to Washington for DynCorp personnel to attend weekly meetings, even though DynCorp was supposed to have employees in DC who could have attended the meetings. On top of that, the report found that the transportation, hotel and flight costs were all not in compliance with contract regulations.
One example is of an employee purchasing a round-trip ticket for $355, but then changing his ticket so many times that it ended up costing $1,931. Some travel costs were for five-day trips, even though meetings only happened on Tuesdays and Wednesdays.
Overall, the report found that the money was misspent because “State lacked adequate procedures for obligating, monitoring, and deobligating funds for the ANP training program.”
Meanwhile, in other fucked up contract news, State recently signed another contract, worth $8 million, with ArmorGroup to guard the Kabul Embassy.ArmorGroup, you’ll recall, used to hold a contract worth an estimated $189 million to protect the embassy. But that was before the Project on Government Oversight revealed in 2009 that the guard force operated a Lord of the Flies environment, complete with pictures documenting it, of guards peeing on people, eating potato chips out of ass cracks, doing vodka shots out of ass cracks, broken doors after drunken brawls, but not “jamming guys in the ass per se.”
Onward to victory in Afghanistan!!!!!!!!!!!!
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
Drop the Oversight, Take the Cannoli
Can’t have it both ways? Don’t tell the State Department, who wants several billion dollars to assume the role of occupier in Iraq while at the same time demanding little oversight into how it spends taxpayer money.In a previous post, we wrote how State refused to allow the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to audit their police training mission. The US has spent billions training Iraqi police since 2003, and little has been accomplished outside the hemorrhaging of US money into the hands of Dynacorp, the contractor designated by the USG to steal all that money. State says SIGIR jurisdiction is limited to “reconstruction” activities, as opposed to “technical assistance and capacity-building.” A fight before Congress will resolve the matter since the kids can’t settle it on their own.
But better move fast Congress– SIGIR is scheduled to shut down in 18 months, so all State has to do is s-t-a-l-l.
Last week the Commission on Wartime Contracting asked State to justify in writing any decision to overturn recommendations in favor of suspending or debarring a contractor by other State Department officials, and also for the establishment of a permanent, government-wide special Inspector General for contingency operations.
State said no. Give us the money, stuff your oversight.
The commissioners called State’s opposition to the first recommendation–that it would be overly burdensome–“logically dubious.” After State Department management droid Pat Kennedy could not answer how often recommendations for suspension or debarment are overturned, the commissioners asked how it could be so burdensome if State didn’t even know how frequently it occurred. We hope that gets entered into his next performance review but kinda doubt it.
The commissioners were also skeptical of State’s opposition to a permanent, government-wide Inspector General (IG) for contingency operations. They cited historical examples of State’s history with IGs to support their skepticism of State’s position. For instance, just a few days prior to the hearing, the Washington Times published a story about attempts by State to oppose an investigation by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) based on lack of jurisdiction.
Commissioner Charles Tiefer questioned State’s will to hold its contractors accountable, citing the example of First Kuwaiti General Contracting and Trading. Tiefer noted that a 2009 audit by the State Department IG recommended that State recover $132 million from the contractor for its exceptionally shoddy work constructing the Baghdad Embassy. It has now been almost two years since the release of that report and as Kennedy acknowledged in the hearing, State still has not asked the company to pay up. We hope that also gets entered into his next performance review but again kinda doubt it.
A full accounting of the problems found in the Baghdad Embassy is worth reading.
To make matters worse, despite First Kuwaiti’s sad performance in Baghdad, the company continued to get work building for State in Saudi Arabia and Gabon as a subcontractor through an American company called Aurora, LLC, which some State Department officials suspect was established to serve as a front company for First Kuwaiti.
So why worry, eh?
Read more about the need for aggressive IG oversight at State in POGO’s November 2010 letter to President Obama.
Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. The views expressed here are solely those of the author(s) in their private capacity.
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